Although four out of ve manufacturing employees work in production occupations in most countries (as opposed to white collar occupations), there is little international evidence on how the transition to more capital intensive production methods has aected the demand for dierent groups of manufacturing production workers. In this article, I use new occupational wage and employment data to document a global decline in the relative demand for skilled production workers in manufacturing since the 1950s. They tended to work in craftsman occupations, and commanded wages even rivaling those of some white collar workers. However, the demand for manufacturing craftsmen decreased in countries of all income groups and regions over the following decades, and declining relative craftsmen wages and employment have been associated with increasing capital intensities of production. My ndings reconcile conicting characterizations of technological change throughout the 20th century as either`skill biased' or`deskilling', and suggest that the polarization of labor demand in manufacturing precedes ICT. They also point to a decreasing number of manufacturing jobs in which workers with little formal education can acquire signicant marketable skills.
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Introduction
There is mounting evidence that the increasing adoption of ICT has reduced the demand for medium-skilled workers in the labor markets of high income countries. 1 This polarization of labor demand raises concerns about social mobility: is it still possible for workers in unskilled occupations to climb up the occupational wage ladder, when an increasing number of steps in the middle are missing? However, the diagnosis of a polarization or`hollowing out of the middle' leaves open the question whether the displaced workers have moved up or down in the wage distribution. Goos et al. (2009) for Europe and Autor (2019) for the US show that in the aggregate, labor market polarization appears to have been driven mostly by the middle-class joining the upper-class, which may soothe concerns about declining social mobility. 2 In this respect, the recent labor market polarization appears to stand in sharp contrast with a historical precedent, the polarization of labor demand in US manufacturing during the nineteenth century. While Katz and Margo (2014) document that also the move to more capital-intensive factory production in this period was polarizing by reducing the demand for medium-skilled artisans relative to both low-skilled laborers and operatives and high-skilled white collar workers, the literature emphasizes the deskilling aspects of this episode: the initially well-remunerated handicraft skills which artisans possessed lost much of their value as production was broken into simple parts that could be carried out by unskilled workers using special purpose machines. 3 A rst question this comparison raises is whether the recent episode of labor market polarization really has been fundamentally dierent in this respect, or whether it has also been deskilling at least for some groups of workers: for the US, Autor (2019) indeed nds strong evidence of deskilling between 1970 and 2016 once restricting his sample to non-college workers:`almost all occupational change among non-college workers reects a movement from the middle toward the bottom of the occupational distribution. Thus, not only has technology change been transformational, it has been broadly deskillingby which I mean that it has narrowed the set of jobs in which non-college workers perform specialized work that historically (...) commanded higher pay levels' (p. 9). However, it remains unclear whether such deskilling has been a worldwide phenomenon, as the modern literature has tended to base its nding of pervasive skill-bias in technological change on aggregate proxies such as an increasing wage bill share of white collar workers. 4 This may hide substantial heterogeneity among blue collar workers.
A second interesting question is whether the`deskilling mechanism' highlighted by the historical literaturenamely, an increasing automation of dexterity-intensive artisanal tasks in manufacturinghas contin-1 See Autor et al. (2003) , Autor et al. (2006) and for evidence from the US, and Goos and Manning (2007) , Goos et al. (2009) , Goos et al. (2014) and Michaels et al. (2014) for international evidence of labor market polarization.
2 For instance, Goos et al. (2009) compare employment changes in 16 European countries between 1993 and 2006 for the eight highest paying occupations, the nine middling occupations and the four lowest paying occupations: they nd that while the joint employment share in middling occupations decreased by 9 percentage points over this period, employment in the lowest paying occupations increased by only 1.2 percentage points-with the highest paying occupations registering a corresponding increase in employment of 7.8 percentage points. 3 For evidence of deskilling in US manufacturing during the 19th century, see Field (1980) , Goldin and Sokolo (1982) , James and Skinner (1985) and Atack et al. (2004) . 4 For instance, see Berman et al. (1994) for US evidence of an increasing wage bill share of white collar workers during the 1980s. Berman et al. (1998) and Berman and Machin (2000) nd that this nding generalizes to a large number of countries since the 1970s, and conclude that there has been pervasive skill-biased technological change also on a global scale. Also Autor (2019) notes that this conventional framing of recent technological change as skill-biased is somewhat prone to concealing potential deskilling aspects:`A foundational assumption of the modern literature on skill demand, dating at least to Tinbergen (1974) , is that technological progress complementsand hence raises demand foreducated workers. This framing might suggest that highly-educated workers should see their work transformed by technology. While this transformation has to some degree occurred, a clear takeaway from this descriptive analysis is that changes in the nature of workmany of which are technological in originhave been far more profound and, arguably, far more disruptive for less-educated workers than they have been for more-educated workers ' (p. 9). ued to operate also in recent decades: while Goldin and Katz (1998) argue that technological change in US manufacturing had become skill-biased already by the early twentieth century following the adoption of continuous-process production methods, their framework distinguishes between only two skill types, skilled and unskilled workers. Hence, little is said about the fate of manufacturing artisans and their handicraft skills during the twentieth and early twenty-rst century, in which artisans have tended to be medium-skilled: less skilled than white collar workers, but considerably more skilled than other manufacturing production workers. This omission is particularly salient for developing countries, for which the literature review by Tybout (2000) points to a dominance of small-scale and artisanal manufacturing shops at least until recently.
In this paper, I use new occupational wage and employment datasets to show that automation since the 1950s has been deskilling among manufacturing production workers around the world: in the beginning of my sample period, most manufacturing employees worked in medium-skilled craftsman occupations, jobs which required handicraft skills and a good understanding of the entire production process. Wages in these skilled production (or`blue collar') occupations even rivalled those in some nonproduction (or`white collar') occupations. I document a pervasive reduction in the relative demand for craftsmen in countries of all income levels and world regions over the subsequent decades, following the adoption of more capital intensive production technologies. By contrast, the relative demand for both unskilled other production workers and skilled white collar workers increased, mirroring the ndings by Katz and Margo (2014) for US manufacturing during the nineteenth century. This suggests some continuity over time in the`polarizing' impact of technological change on labor demand, and implies that countries worldwide have been confronted with the associated challenges.
This paper contribute to two literatures. First, my ndings add to the literature on the eects of technological change on skill demand: they are consistent with a demand shift favoring white collar workers (Berman et al., 1998; Berman and Machin, 2000) , but at the same time highlight that such workers tended to account for less than 20 percent of manufacturing employment in most countries for most of the sample period. For a more rened characterization of global labor demand trends in manufacturing since the 1950s, I combine wages from the extended`Occupational Wages around the World' database (OWW) by with occupational employment data from the`Integrated Public Use Microdata Series' (Minnesota Population Center, 2018) and the`International Income Distribution Data Set' (Montenegro and Hirn, 2009) , going beyond the existing literature in terms of the countries and time period covered and in the level of detail of occupational categories. Moreover, relative occupational wages have the advantage of not only reecting skill dierences related to formal education, but also taking into account skills acquired through informal apprenticeships and learning on the job. This is particularly important when analyzing changes in the demand for skill in countries and time periods where formal educational attainments are low.
Among production workers, I nd evidence of declining returns to skill: craftsman occupations experienced decreasing wages and employment, relative to other production workers who were considerably less skilled initially. For developing countries with often still mostly artisanal manufacturing sectors (Tybout, 2000) , my ndings are consistent with the model of manufacturing labor demand by Goldin and Katz (1998) in which the rst automation step towards larger-scale factory production favors unskilled machine operators and laborers at the expense of the more skilled craftsmen. 5 However, the demand for manufacturing craftsmen continued to decline also in high income countries.
Therefore, my ndings reconcile the long-standing view that technological change over the 20th century has been skill-biased with the forceful and widely-discussed claim by Braverman (1974) that it has been deskilling for most workers. 6 While employment trends are consistent with an increasing demand for (skilled) white collar workers, my ndings suggest that Braverman was correct to point out that the substantial skills that craftsmen in manufacturing possessed lost much of their value following the adoption of more capital intensive production methods.
Second, this paper contributes to a literature initiated by Autor et al. (2003) , which analyzes the eects of technological change on labor demand from the perspective of occupational tasks. This perspective highlights that the skill required to perform a specic task does not need to coincide with its susceptibility to automation, implying that the eect of technological change on skill demand will often not be monotonous.
To illustrate how a fall in the relative price of capital may account for the observed decline of craftsman wages and employment relative to other production workers, Section 4 presents an adapted version of the task model from Autor et al. (2003) : in this model, an increasing use of capital substitutes for automatable tasks, while complementing non-automatable tasks. I nd that this capital deepening (dened as the adoption of more capital intensive production methods) has been signicantly associated with decreases in the relative wage and employment of craftsmen, consistent with the assumption that craftsmen have tended to perform the most automatable production worker tasks. 7
Also Bessen (2011) and Katz and Margo (2014) note the parallel between the recent labor market polarization in the aggregate economy and the decline of medium-skilled artisanshowever, with respect to US manufacturing in the nineteenth century. By contrast, my ndings highlight that the process of substituting craftsmen with capital continued even after 1950. This points to a striking continuity of manufacturing automation replacing artisanal tasks stretching from the nineteenth to the early twenty-rst century, and suggests that the polarization of labor demand in manufacturing precedes ICT.
Finally, task models highlight that automation not only displaces workers from tasks henceforth performed by capital, but also increases their productivity in the remaining tasks and creates new tasks in which labor has a comparative advantage (Autor et al., 2003; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Restrepo, 2018, 2019) . However, I nd little evidence of other production workers acquiring marketable skills comparable to the ones that manufacturing craftsmen traditionally possessed, suggesting that any new skill-intensive tasks created by automation have tended to be tasks for white collar workers. This is consistent with the deskilling among US non-college workers in recent decades documented by Autor (2019). 8 In summary, this paper documents a worldwide decline in the demand for skilled manufacturing production workers since the 1950s, which appears to be well explained by a substitution of craftsman tasks with 6 For instance, Tinbergen (1974) introduced the metaphor of a`race between technology and education' to illustrate the widespread idea that technological change is skill-biased and increases skill premia, unless also educational attainments increase suciently. By contrast, in his widely-discussed book`Labor and monopoly capital: The degradation of work in the twentieth century', published in the same year, Braverman argued that there had been a`destruction of craftsmanship' (p. 94) throughout the 20th century, and that`the capitalist mode of production systematically destroys all-around skills where they exist ' (p. 57) . 7 In a companion paper (Kunst, 2019) , I argue that also the tasks of unskilled machine operator and elementary occupations have become increasingly automatable when comparing the 1960-1990 to the post-1990 period. This implies that fewer unskilled jobs have been created to make up for the loss of craftsman employment in recent decades, leading to the phenomenon of premature deindustrialization' that has rst been documented by Rodrik (2016) . Since the present paper focuses on the composition of occupational labor demand within manufacturing, my argument only requires that craftsmen jobs have tended to be more automatable than other production worker jobs over the sample period. 8 Autor writes:`Labor markets in U.S. cities today are vastly more educated and skill-intensive than they were ve decades ago. Yet, urban non-college workers perform substantially less skilled work than decades earlier. This deskilling reects the joint eects of automation and international trade, which have eliminated the bulk of non-college production, administrative support, and clerical jobs, yielding a disproportionate polarization of urban labor markets' (p. 1). While this quote focuses on urban non-college workers, Figure 5 on page 10 of Autor (2019) suggests that the pattern also holds true for all working age adults.
capital. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the wage and employment data, and uses them to characterize the three groups of manufacturing occupations that guide my analyses throughout the rest of the paper. Section 3 documents the pervasive decline in the wages and employment of manufacturing craftsmen relative to other production workers. Section 4 argues that the declining demand for craftsmen can be understood through the lens of the task-framework introduced by Autor et al. (2003) , and provides evidence supporting the view that it has been related to an increasing automation of tasks previously performed by craftsmen. It also addresses the question whether the deskilling of craftsmen has been accompanied by other production workers gaining marketable skills. Section 5 discusses implications of these ndings.
Global Manufacturing Through the Lens of Occupations
This Section introduces novel databases of occupational wage and employment data that oer two main advantages over those used by existing cross-country studies: rst, they allow me to distinguish between dierent groups of manufacturing production workers in a way that is consistent across countries and over time, moving beyond the coarse`white collar versus production' distinction existing papers usually have to make because of data limitations. 9 As I will argue throughout the rest of this Section, this distinction matters, as production workers are a large and heterogeneous group of manufacturing employees.
Second, they extend the country and time coverage signicantly beyond commonly available data sets: my sample includes occupational wages from 169 countries between 1953 and 2008, and occupational employment from 146 countries between 1960 and 2016, and this broad coverage allows me to distinguish global trends from more country-or period specic developments. 10 In particluar, Berman et al. (1998) point out that the pervasiveness of labor demand changes can be considered as a testable implication of technological changebased explanations, which highlights the benets of a broad sample coverage in terms of the income levels and regions of the represented countries.
Occupational Wage Data from OWW
OWW is based on the`October Inquiry' by the International Labor Organization (ILO)an annual request to national statistical oces to submit wage data for a number of narrowly dened occupations, described in more detail in Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) . Throughout the paper, I distinguish between three groups of manufacturing occupations, which I argue to have been aected dierently by the move towards more capital intensive production technologies: craftsman-9 For instance, the United Nations General Industrial Statistics Database used by Berman et al. (1998) only contains disaggregated data for`operatives', dened as all employees directly engaged in production or related activities of the establishment, next to the data for aggregate manufacturing.
10 For instance, the EUKLEMS database allows Michaels et al. (2014) to study the polarizing impact of ICT on labor markets only for eleven OECD countries between 1980 and 2004 , and Ashenfelter (2012 points out that the lack of internationally comparable wage data over long time periods`is one of the most serious gaps in our evolving system of economic measurement' (p. 618).
11 So far, only the data from 1983 is openly available on the website of NBER. The extended data set used in this paper is introduced in , and will soon also be made available.
, other production-, and white collar occupations. 12 According to the description provided by the ILO, craftsman tasks`require the knowledge and experience of skilled trades or handicrafts which, among other things, involves an understanding of materials and tools to be used, as well as of all stages of the production process, including the characteristics and the intended use of the nal product' (quoted from the description of major groups in Appendix C). Figure 1 presents the wage premia of 8 manufacturing craftsman occupations in the 1950s, relative to the average manufacturing wage report by countries, and shows that handicraft in manufacturing tended to be well remunerated: craftsman wage premia equal 15 log points on average (ranging from close to zero to 39 log points). 13 Other production occupations include machine operators, whose`main tasks consist of operating and monitoring (...) production machinery and equipment', and elementary occupations, who`perform mostly simple and routine tasks, involving the use of hand-held tools and in some cases considerable physical eort'. They commanded wages that were 13 log points below the averagethough with considerable dispersion around that average, partly due to wage level dierences between manufacturing industries.
For instance,`printing & publishing' tended to be a high wage industry in the 1950s, accounting for both the best-paid craftsman occupation (`machine compositor' ) and other production occupation (`printing pressman' ). However, Figure 1 shows that within this industry, the craftsman occupation again commanded higher wages than the machine operator occupation. By contrast,`textiles' was a low wage industryand while the occupation`loom xer, tuner' was among the lowest paid craftsman occupations, it still commanded considerably higher wages than`cloth weavers (machine)', a machine operator occupation from the same industry.
The latter example also highlights that manufacturing craftsmen often work together with other production workers, as the description of cloth weavers directly refers to loom xers and tuners:`Operates and tends battery of looms to weave yarn into cloth: starts set-up loom and observes weaving operation; (...); reports mechanical faults to loom xer.' Loom xers in turn`set, inspect and repair looms of various kinds: prepare looms for weaving new pattern or dierent quality of product (...); operate loom manually to check movements (...) and make necessary adjustments; hand loom over to weaver for operation; inspect loom periodically and keep in good working order; make repairs (...); replace empty warp beams with full ones'. 14 When craftsmen and other production workers work together, craftsmen are hence in charge of setting up machines and taking over production steps that machines operated by unskilled workers cannot (yet) perform on their own. 12 Craftsmen correspond to major group 7 of the International Standard Classication of Occupations (ISCO), other production occupations include major groups 8 (`Plant and machine operators and assemblers' ) and 9 (`Elementary occupations' ), and white collar occupations subsume major groups 1 (`Legislators, senior ocials and managers' ), 2 (`Professionals' ), 3 (`Technicians and associate professionals' ) and 4 (`Clerks' ). In Kunst (2019) , I argue that it is insightful to further distinguish between the high skilled white collar occupations in major groups 1-3 and the medium skilled clerks in major group 4 when analyzing the recent impact of ICT on the labor demand in manufacturing. However, this distinction becomes most relevant towards the end of my sample period, and is not the focus of this paper. OWW does not include any manufacturing occupations from major groups 5 (`Service workers and shop and market sales workers' ) and 6 (`Skilled agricultural and shery workers' ), which also do not play an important role in manufacturing in terms of employment.
13 The occupation xed eects are similar across countries with dierent income levels: when estimating them seperately for low-, middle-and high income countries, the correlations of occupation xed eects by income group with the ones for the pooled sample range between 0.97-0.99.
14 These descriptions are quoted from the detailed description of`October Inquiry' occupations, given to the national statistical oces by the ILO. For the printing industry, the corresponding tasks of the craftsman occupation`machine compositor' are described separately by machine type:`sets and arranges printing type by machine: (a) Linotype operator (...) (b) Monotype keyboard operator (...) (c) Computer keyboard operator (...) (d) Typewriter keyboard operator (...) (e) Filmsetter keyboard operator (...)'. The tasks of the machine operator occupation`printing pressman' are described as follows, again for dierent machine types:`Sets and operates various types of machines which print on paper and other materials: (...).' Additional detailed descriptions are available on request. See Section 3 for references to case studies describing technological changes in the textiles and printing industries over the sample period. Other production Other production Other production Other production Other production Other production Other production Other production Other production Other production Other production Other production Other production Hence, they represent the average deviation of the wage in an occupation group from the average country-year wage report. The dots in light grey are the corresponding occupation xed eects from a regression on occupation instead of (coarser) occupation group xed eects. All occupations are labelled with the occupation code, and selected ones also with the name of the occupation. Appendix B.1 contains a full list of occupations, including occupation codes.
Note that there is no reference category because the intercept is instead chosen such that the prediction calculated at the means of the independent variables equal to the mean wage in the sample.
Occupational Employment Data from IPUMS and I2D2
A drawback of OWW is that it does not include occupational employment data. 15 To complement wages with employment data, I combine census and survey data from the`Integrated Public Use Microdata Series' (IPUMS), hosted by the Minnesota Population Center (2018), with survey data from the`International Income Distribution Data Set' (I2D2). I2D2 is a collection of harmonized and nationally representative household surveys introduced by Montenegro and Hirn (2009) and maintained by the World Bank. 16 The resulting data set contains the distribution of manufacturing wage employment across the three occupation groups for 955 country-year observations from 146 countries between 1960 and 2016. 17 However, 15 However, the description of the`October Inquiry' states that occupations were chosen with regard to economic relevance: the occupations and industry groups covered comprise, as far as possible, those which are important in terms of the number of persons employed in them'.
16 I2D2 is currently not openly available to researchers outside the World Bank. I am grateful to Kathleen G. Beegle, Claudio E. Montenegro, David Newhouse and Aditi Mishra for their help in accessing the I2D2 surveys.
17 I hence exclude manufacturing workers classied as self-employed or as non wage-employed/ working in the family business, which represent about 30 percent of manufacturing employees on average. I do this to allow for a cleaner comparison to the wage data from OWW, which does not take account of the earnings of non-wage workers or the self-employed. See Appendix coverage for the earlier years is scarcer: 90 percent of the surveys are from 1990 or later, and 74 percent are from 2000 or later.
To examine how the occupational employment mix within manufacturing typically varies with a country's income level, Appendix Table A.1 presents the results from regressing the employment share of craftsmen, other production workers and white collar workers within manufacturing on the best-tting third order polynomial of ln GDP per capita, decade dummies and country xed eects. 18 Figure 2 plots the corresponding tted relationship for a`typical' country in the sample, with averaged period and country xed eects: it shows that the large majority of manufacturing employees in low income countries tends to work in craftsman occupations, and that their share in total manufacturing employment declines with incomewith particularly rapid declines at intermediate levels of income. However, it is only after an employment level of around $10,000 (in 2011 international $) that they cease to be the most important group of manufacturing employees. By contrast, the employment share of other production workers tends to increase with income, up to an estimated peak of around 39 percent, reached at an income level around $18,000. Afterwards, it also declines. Finally, the employment share of white collar workers in manufacturing is slightly U-shaped, and increases strongly only at higher levels of income. 19 Table 1 summarizes additional survey information. Not all of the variables are available for all countries, and column (1) indicates the number of countries across which the sample average has been calculated. The average survey is from the year 2002, so that the Figures are most representative of the later part of the sample period. The rst row indicates that craftsmen and other production workers on average represent more than 70 percent of all manufacturing employees in the sample. The second row shows that while both groups of production workers earn wages below the manufacturing average in the survey data, craftsmen still tended to be better paid than other production workersconsistent with the ranking of OWW wages in the 1950s shown in Figure 1 . 20 However, the middle panel indicates that average educational attainments of craftsmen and other production workers in the surveys are comparable, and the bottom rows show that craftsmen tended to work in smaller establishments than other production and white collar workers. 21 In summary, OWW wage and survey data consistently characterize craftsmen as the best-paid manufacturing production workers, who likely obtain much of the (handicraft) skills that dierentiate them from other production workers by means of informal apprenticeships and training on the job rather than formal education. They tend to work in smaller establishments, likely reecting a lower division of labor, and their importance in manufacturing tends to decline with a country's income level.
B for a more detailed description of the sample construction.
18 Using a third order polynomial ensures that the tted curves could in principle take a large number of possible shapes, and F-test reject the need for even higher order polynomials. The polynomial terms are selected by Stata's`fp' command (with default settings), which compares 164 models and select the best-tting one. See the note of Appendix Table A.1 for further details.
19 The U-shape of white collar employment may reect economies of scale at intermediate income levels, where expanding factories permit a white collar worker to instruct a larger number of production workers. Table 1 conrms that other production workers, whose employment share expands particularly rapidly at intermediate income levels, indeed tend to work in larger establishments. By contrast, as GDP per capita increases further, the handling of advanced machines increasingly requires white collar' professionals. 20 For the sake of readability, Table 1 omits tests for the signicance of dierences between means. However, the dierence between average craftsman and other production worker wages is highly signicant (pval=0.00).
21 For all educational attainments, the dierences between both groups of production workers are insignicant. The dierences between average rm sizes are insignicant (pval=0.33 for the upper limit, and pval=0.18 for the lower limit). However, this is due to large standard deviations resulting from large cross-country dierences in average manufacturing rm sizes across all occupation groups. In 84 percent of countries, the average upper rm size-bracket of other production workers exceeds the one for craftsmen, and this is the case for 90 percent of countries with respect to the lower rm size bracket. Hence, the survey data do robustly suggest that craftsmen tend to work in smaller establishments. 
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The Changing Fortunes of Craftsmen Figure 3 summarizes the evolution of the craftsman wage premium relative to other production workers over a period of 6 decades for a balanced sample of 86 countries. It reveals a substantial and monotonous decline in the wage premium of craftsmen, from an average of 31.8 log points in the 1950s to 8.3 in the 2000s. 22 The dotted lines split the sample by income group, following the World Bank's income classication in 1990. 23 They suggest that craftsmen were the most skilled production workers in countries of all income groups, 22 Note that the OWW wage premium of craftsmen over other production workers in the 2000s corresponds very closely to the corresponding wage premium of 8.2 log points in Table 1 , which is calculated from the I2D2 and IPUMS surveys (and which is on average also based on surveys from the early 2000s).
23 I calculate it as the (max) mode of all available classications between 1987 (the rst year for which World Bank income classications are available) and 1993, to deal with missing classications. Using the 1990 income classication has the advantage that the classication broadly corresponds to well established notions about the income status of countries, and is usually representative for most of the sample period. However, given the pervasiveness of the decline of craftsman wage premia documented in this paper, the picture does not change much when using (estimated) income groups from the beginning or end of the sample period instead. data. For countries with data for several years, I take the average across available years. Hence, all countries have the same weight. The rst row presents the distribution of manufacturing wage employment of men and women aged 15-64 across occupations. Employment in the`all groups' columns is less than 100 because it excludes manufacturing employees classied as working major group 5 (`service and sales workers') and 6 (`skilled agricultural, forestry and shery workers'). These major groups are not represented among the manufacturing occupations in OWW, and play a negligible role for manufacturing in surveys from most countries. The second row depicts the wage premium relative to total manufacturing in log points. Firmsizes are reported as`upper' and`lower' bounds of the size category that the establishment falls into. For the`tertiary education' variable, I2D2 surveys include those who started their tertiary education, whereas IPUMS surveys include only those who also completed it.
yet enjoyed particularly high wage premia in low and middle income countries. 24 However, craftsmen in these countries also experienced particularly stark declines in their wage premium, and craftsmen in middle income countries earned the lowest wage premia by the 2000s. Appendix Figure A .1 compares the distribution of the craftsman wage premium in the 1950s and the 2000s for the same sample, and conrms that the entire distribution of wage premia has shifted to the left.
Appendix Figure A .2 shows that craftsman wages declined relative to both occupation groups subsumed in the`other production' category, machine operators and workers in elementary occupations.
While Figure 3 shows the results for a balanced sample of 86 countries, Table 2 presents the results of regressions of log wages of all manufacturing craftsman and other production wages reported in OWW on interactions of decade dummies and a`craftsman' dummy for all 158 countries. The specications include country-occupation xed eects (so that the identication comes from changes within country-occupation series over time) and country-year xed eects (to control for changes in wage levels), and cluster standard errors at the country level. Comparing the 1950s to the 2000s, the point estimate for the pooled sample of 158 countries in Column (1) suggests a signicant decline by 20.9 log points, similar to the decline in the balanced sample.
Note that these comparisons include wages from craftsmen and other production occupations in dierent manufacturing industries. For instance, I may compare wages in the craftsman occupation`cabinetmaker' from the`manufacture of furniture and xtures' industry with the other production occupation`mixing and blending-machine operator' from the`manufacture of industrial chemicals' industry. This should not pose a problem if the task dierences between craftsmen and other production occupations are suciently general, as the denition of major groups suggests. As a robustness check, I use the fact that OWW includes at least one craftsman and one other production occupation for three manufacturing industries, allowing me to track the evolution of the craftsman wage premium within these industries.
Figure 4 presents two such examples from the textiles and the printing and publishing industries: the left panel plots all wage premia of`loom xers, tuners' (a craftsman occupation) relative to`cloth weavers (machine)' in the sample against the year of the report, and the right panel presents all wage premia of`machine compositors' (a craftsman occupation) relative to`printing pressmen' (see Section 2.1 for a description of these occupations). To help with the interpretation, both panels include a non-parametric local polynomial t, and the subtitles present the point estimates from a regression on country xed eects and a trend. Fitted wage premia in 1953 from the xed eects-regression range between 17.5 log points for machine compositors' and 24 log points for`loom xers, tuners', and declined signicantly by on average 3.8-4 log points per decade over the subsequent 6 decades (similar to the decline of average craftsman wage premia in Figure 3 ). Hence, tted wage premia in 2008 amounted to only 2.1 log points for`loom xers, tuners', and minus 3.2 log points for`machine compositors'. 25 These ndings are consistent with country-industry case studies from the textiles and printing industry:
Rasiah (1993) documents rapid automation in a sample of Malaysian textile rms during the 1980s. By the end of the decade, nine of the eleven bre-making, spinning and weaving rms in his study had switched to using shuttleless air-jet looms, reducing the demand for some skilled craftsmen:`skilled menders who spot and swiftly mend breaks in the weaved and knitted cloth became redundant as the automated machines enabled break free weaving and knitting' (p. 18). Rasiah reports that in particular skills requiring dexterity had become less important due to the adoption of the new machines. 26 Wallace and Kalleberg (1982) review how technological changes in the US printing industry have changed labor demand over time: they argue that`by all accounts, printers have enjoyed a privileged status among manufacturing workers since the early 1800s', and that well into the twentieth century,`printers were expected to be procient in all phases of printing production from composition to presswork' (pp. 308-309 The right panel plots all wage premia of`machine compositors' (a craftsman occupation) over`printing pressmen' (a machine operator occupation) in the printing industry over time. Wage premia could be calculated for 156 countries and 2,615 country-year observations.
As Berman et al. (1998) point out, a testable prediction of technological change-based explanations of the wage structure is that changes should be pervasive, and hence visible in countries with dierent income levels, policies and macroeconomic experiences. 28 Columns (2)-(4) of Table 2 conrm that while declines in relative craftsman wages were about double as strong in low and middle income countries, they are signicant in countries of all income groups. Columns (5)- (7) compare the evolution of relative craftsmen wages in Africa and Latin Americafor which Rodrik (2016) nds declining shares of manufacturing employment and value added since the 1980sand Asia, which has tended to experience signicant industrialization. In all country groups, there has been a signicant decline of craftsman wage premia.
This highlights that the trends described in this Section are consistent with very dierent performances of the manufacturing sector in the aggregate economy: craftsmen may lose out in an expanding, exportoriented manufacturing sector that switches to a more capital intensive production technology in response to falling costs of capital or to comply with increasing consumer demands, as well as in a contracting, import- 28 With the caveat that technology adoption lags across countries are often substantial (Comin and Hobijn, 2010 Guimaraes and Portugal (2011) to deal with the large number of xed eects in these regressions.
A second testable implication of a technological change-induced demand shift against craftsmen is a pervasive decline also in their employment share. For a rst impression, Figure 5 shows plots the number of craftsmen per other production worker, comparing the rst available year with data before 1990 with the last available year after 1990 for 44 countries with data for both periods: 30 in the rst year (on average, 1974), there were on average 4.9 craftsmen per other production worker. In the last year (on average, 2009), this number had decreased to 1.4 craftsmen per other production worker in the same countries. While a few countries (such as PRY-Paraguay or HND-Honduras) experienced particularly large decreases, the number of craftsman per other production worker decreased in 38 of the 44 countries, consistent with a pervasive demand shift against craftsmen.
For a more systematic illustration of trends in the occupational employment mix within manufacturing, Table 3 regresses the employment shares of other production workers (`O'), craftsmen (`C') and white collar workers (`WC') on country xed eects and a trend. While the focus of this paper is on the two groups of production workers, I include the results for white collar workers to allow for a direct comparison to thè production worker versus white collar'-distinctions that is common in the existing literature. To focus on employment changes across these three groups of workers, I normalize the shares to sum to one in each survey. The rst panel in the top row shows that in the pooled sample, craftsmen experienced strong and signicant employment share decreases of 4 percentage points per decade, whereas the employment shares of both other production and white collar occupations both increased by 2 percentage points per decade.
The other panels show that across all income groups and regions, point estimates suggest a decreasing employment share of manufacturing craftsmen, with particularly large decreases in middle income and Asian countries. By contrast, employment shares in other production and white collar occupations either show no signicant change or increased. 31 In summary, the initially well-paid manufacturing craftsmen experienced strong and global declines in their relative wages since the 1950s, and also their employment share has declinedconsistent with a pervasive decline in the demand for craftsman tasks in manufacturing. 32
31 Notably, the point estimate of other production occupations in high income countries is (insignicantly) negative, and of the same size as the point estimate for craftsmen: in Kunst (2019) , I argue that the demand for other production workers declines with the following automation step towards digitally controlled machines. Such machines require less unskilled human operators, and also reduce the need for hauling and conveying operations performed by unskilled laborers. Since such technologies were rst adopted in high income countries, the reduction in the employment share of other production workers is already apparent for these countries. In Kunst (2019) , I show that once conditioning on GDP per capita, employment in such occupations has decreased also in middle income countries when comparing the 1960-1990 to the post-1990 period. 32 An alternative test to rule out a supply-side explanation of the declining craftsman wages is to control for the average educational attainment by country-year in the relative wage-regressions and its interaction with a craftsman-dummy (which requires dropping the then collinear country-period xed eects). The nding of a prevasive decline of relative craftsman wages is robust to controlling for a variety of dierent educational attainment measures in this way (results available upon request). However, note that skill dierences among manufacturing production workers are likely in large part due to on-the-job training in most countries and years in my sample (cf. 
(8)
(10) 
(10) WC' for`white collar'. Manufacturing employment shares in these three groups are standardized to sum to 100 in each survey, so that the point estimates in the three groups sum to zero. All region groups exclude high income countries, and`ECA' in the bottom panel stands for`Europe and Central Asia'.
An Interpretive Framework
In this Section, I borrow the model from Autor et al. (2003) to show how increasing capital intensities in manufacturing may account for the observed reduction in the relative demand for craftsmen. While Autor et al. (2003) use this model to study the eect of computer capital on task demand in the aggregate US economy, I argue that it is equally useful to illustrate the mechanism behind the reduction in the demand for tasks that can be performed by capital more generally (including non-ICT capital).
Capital Deepening and the Demand for Craftsmen
Following the previous discussions, I think of craftsmen as the production workers performing the most automatable tasks: as the example of`loom xers, tuners' and`cloth weavers (machine)' in the textiles industry illustrates, craftsmen tend to be engaged in handicraft tasks that cannot yet be performed costeectively by machines (cf. the task descriptions in Section 2.1)a range of tasks that has narrowed over time, as machines have become increasingly wide-spread and capable (cf. the case studies in Section 3).
To avoid possible confusion with the literature on routine-biased technological changewhich studies the eects of computer/ICT capital rather than`old school' total capital, I refer to`automatable' rather thaǹ routine' tasks. However, Appendix Figure A .4 shows that craftsmen also score higher than both groups of other production workers as well as white collar occupations on the`routine task intensity index' (RTI)
introduced by . Hence, the demand shift against manufacturing craftsmen can already be characterized as`routine biased' when using a measure of the relative importance of routine to non-routine tasks that is widely used in the recent literature on labor market polarization. 33
By contrast, the move towards more capital-intensive factory production increased the demand for other production workers, namely machine operators and laborers for hauling and conveying operationsat least in the earlier part of my sample period and in developing countries with technologically less advanced manufacturing industries, prior to the adoption of more advanced and digitally controlled machines (cf. Katz 1998, and Kunst 2019) .
This informal discussion of typical craftsman and other production tasks and their interaction with capital can be summarized in three assumptions:
• A1. In manufacturing, capital tended to be more substitutable for tasks performed by craftsmen (`automatable tasks') than for tasks performed by other production workers.
• A2. Automatable and other production task inputs are imperfect substitutes.
• A3. A greater use of automatable task input increases the marginal productivity of other production tasks.
More specically, suppose the production function in manufacturing is given by Equation 1. L c is craftsman labor input, K is capital input, and L o is other production labor input, all measured in eciency units. For simplicity, this production function implies a perfect substitutability between craftsmen and capital inputs, and an elasticity of one between automatable and other production inputs. However, the only substantive model requirement is that capital input is more substitutable for craftsmen than for other production labor input (cf. A1. and A2.). Moreover, automatable and other production task inputs are complements with this production function, consistent with A3. I abstract from nonproduction/white collar labor input here, but A1-A3 remain reasonable also if we instead assume L o to include white collar workers. 34
I further assume that there is a large number of income-maximizing workers, each of whom inelastically supplies one unit of labor to the manufacturing industry. 35 Workers have heterogeneous productivity en- input. These assumptions imply that workers will choose tasks according to their comparative advantage as in Roy (1951) . The framework hence allows for changes in craftsmen versus other production task supplies in reaction to changes in the relative wage, and hence for changes in the relative employment of craftsmen and other production workers. I assume that capital is supplied perfectly elastically at price r. Since craftsmen and capital inputs are perfect substitutes, the craftsmen wage is pinned down by the price of capital (Equation 2). 36 Given r, the self-selection of workers into craftsmen and other production jobs clears the labor market.
To characterize the relative employment of craftsmen versus other production workers, I dene the relative productivity of individual i in performing automatable versus craftsmen tasks as η i = oi ci . The assumptions above imply that η i ∈ (0, ∞). At the labor market equilibrium, the marginal worker with relative eciency units η * is indierent between performing craftsmen and other production tasks when η * = wc wo . Individual i works as a craftsman if η i < η * , and works as an other production worker otherwise. Functions g(η)
and h(η) characterize the total labor supply of craftsmen and other production labor, respectively. g(η) =
is the indicator function. Moreover, productive eciency requires that craftsmen and other production workers wages equal their marginal productivities (Equations 4 and 5), where θ is the ratio of automatable to other production input in production (Equation 3):
One can use Equations 1-5 to study the eect of a decrease of the price of capital on θ and the relative 34 In Section 4.2, I show that also the empirical tests of the model are robust to including white collar occupations in Lo. 35 Since I am concerned with labor demand changes within manufacturing, I abstract from employment ows between industries. 36 I implicitly assume that the shadow wage of craftsmen absent capital exceeds r so that Equation 2 holds with equality.
craftsmen versus other production wage and employment: rst, Equation 6 shows that a decrease in the price of capital will increase the ratio of automatable input to other production input in production. 37
From the perspective of producers, this increase in automatable input could come either from increasing K or from increasing L c . However, Equation 7 shows that the increasing use of automatable inputs will be met entirely by increasing K, since η * decreases alongside r so that L c declines (as more workers choose to become other production workers instead of craftsmen). 38 Since η * = wc wo , also the wage of craftsmen relative to other production workers declines. 
In summary, an exogenous decline in the price of capital raises the marginal productivity of other production tasks, incentivizing craftsmen to work in other production occupations. Although craftsman labor input declines, an inow of capital more than compensates, yielding a net increase in the intensity of automatable (and in fact, increasingly automated) task input in production. Hence, relative employment of craftsmen decreases alongside their relative wage. 39
Has Capital Deepening Reduced the Demand for Craftsmen?
To assess the hypothesis that the declining demand for manufacturing craftsmen is the result of craftsman tasks being taken over by capital, the top panel of Table 4 regresses log wages from manufacturing occupations in 2011 international dollars on alternative measures of the log capital stock per worker (also expressed in 2011 prices). While the value of the capital stock per worker need not be perfectly correlated with the extent to which machines are able to take over tasks previously performed by craftsmen, I consider it as a reasonable proxy. 40 All specications include an interaction of the capital intensity with a dummy taking a value of one for craftsman occupations, to test for an eect of capital intensity on the relative wage of craftsmen.
Since specications include country-occupation xed eects, identication comes from wage variation within country-occupation specic wage series. Moreover, specications include year xed eects to control for global time trends, and cluster standard errors at the country level.
37 It follows from Equations 2 and 4. 38 This follows from Equations 4, 5, and 6. 39 Note that for wages, this is true for wages per eciency unit of task that is supplied, which may dier from observed wages. For example, if there is a positive correlation between worker's abilities to carry out automatable (craftsman) and non-automatable (other production) tasks, the ow of craftsmen into other production jobs in response to a decline in the price of capital reduces the average ability among workers in both occupations. Then, observed craftsman wages unambiguously fall, but observed other production wages may not rise. See Section 4.3 for a discussion of the evolution of craftsman and other production wages relative to a`numeraire'namely, relative to wages outside of manufacturing. A decrease in the average ability of workers to carry out non-automatable task could be another reason for the absence of a clear increase in their observed relative wage documented in that Section. However, this mechanism hinges on displaced craftsmen having a lower average innate productivity when carrying out the mostly simple non-craftsman production worker tasks, and hence appears unlikely to play an important role in practice. 40 An alternative test of the model in Section 4.1 would be to check whether relative craftsman wages and employment have been associated with changes in the price of capital. While it is well established that the relative price of investment to consumption goods has declined globally since the 1950s (cf. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) ), factors other than the relative price of investment goodssuch as openness to foreign direct investment, exports to high income markets, increasing import competition, or factor market imperfections (as argued by Hasan et al. (2013) )are likely to have also inuenced the extent to which more capital intensive production methods have been adopted. I do not attempt to gauge the relative importance of these potential drivers of capital deepening in this paper, and the model hence uses a declining price of capital as a`catch-all' driving force for simplicity. However, I acknowledge that factors other than the relative price of capital are likely to also have played a role in bringing about the observed increases in capital intensity.
Column (1) uses the most widely available capital intensity measure, the economy-wide capital stock per worker from the Penn World Table. Unsurprisingly, wages are positively associated with the capital stock per worker, with an elasticity of 0.58. However, the signicantly negative craftsman-interaction suggests that craftsman wages increased signicantly more slowly with capital intensity than the wages in other production occupations. 41 Since the economy-wide capital stock per worker need not be a good proxy for the capital intensity in manufacturing, I construct manufacturing-specic capital intensities using investment and employment data from the INDSTAT2 database by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2018): I deate the investment data using the price level of capital formation from the Penn World Table, and use the perpetual inventory method to estimate capital stocks, following Caselli (2005) in assuming a 6 percent depreciation rate (see Appendix B.3 for more details). INDSTAT2 allows to estimate capital intensities both for aggregate manufacturing and by 2-digit manufacturing industry. 42 Columns (2) and (3) shows that using either measure of capital intensity, the point estimates of the craftsman-interactions are also signicantly negative, and in the ballpark of the estimate for the economy-wide capital intensity. 43 While the main focus of this article is on demand changes among manufacturing production workers, the literature suggests that also white collar workers tend to be more complementary to capital than craftsmen. Columns (4)-(6) therefore replace the other manufacturing production occupations with white collar occupations, and results suggest that increasing capital intensities tend to be associated with decreasing craftsman wages also relative to this reference group (with signicant point estimates for the economy-wide and the industry-specic capital intensity measures). This is consistent with the view that one may consider the framework in the previous Section as being informative about the demand for manufacturing craftsmen relative to other manufacturing workers more generally (including other production as well as white collar workers).
The bottom panel of Table 4 presents results from corresponding regressions in which the dependent variable is the occupational employment share in manufacturing (omitting the results for the industry-level capital stock estimates, since I do not have employment data at this disaggregated level). Increasing capital intensities are also signicantly associated with decreasing employment shares of craftsmenrelative to other production workers in columns (1)-(2), and relative to white collar workers in columns (4)-(5). In summary, these results corroborate the view that the adoption of more capital intensive production methods has been behind the demand shift against manufacturing craftsmen.
To illustrate the economic signicance of these estimates, one can compare the actually observed change of the average relative craftsman wage and employment in the sample with the change that would be predicted from the capital intensity changes, based on the point estimates in Table 4 . For the countries in the wage sample, Figure 6 compares the distributions of the capital intensity in aggregate manufacturing for the rst 41 For simplicity, the model assumes that craftsman wages are pinned down by the (declining) price of capital, as it is concerned with the demand for craftsman relative to other production workers. In a model that is more informative about absolute craftsman wages, it would appear reasonable to assume that an increasing capital intensity also enhances the productivity of the remaining craftsmen, which could explain the (observed) positive association between capital intensities and absolute craftsman wages.
42 National statistical oces sometimes made reports to UNIDO jointly for several industries. In such cases, I aggregate investment data to the most detailed level for which I could construct a consistent investment series (see Appendix B.3 for details) . This hints at challenges encountered by some statistical oces in assigning capital formation to a unique 2-digit industry. Moreover, note that my investment price deator from the Penn World Table is only available for aggregate manufacturing. While the industry-specic capital intensities are conceptually preferrable, the capital intensities for aggregate manufacturing are hence likely to be measured with less measurement error. 43 Point estimates become insignicant once also allowing for a linear time trend of craftsman wages (not shown). However, they remain negative, and are not signicantly dierent from the point estimates of the time trends. Since both the decline in relative craftsman wages and capital deepening have been pervasive (see Section 3 for craftsmen wages, and Appendix Table A.4which I introduce at the end of this Sectionfor capital deepening), it is perhaps not surprising that it is empirically challenging to disentangle the eects of capital deepening from a pure time trend of relative craftsman wages. and the last year from each country: these are the years 1975 and 1997 on average, and the distribution of capital intensities shifted markedly to the right between both years. 44 The average capital stock per worker more than doubled from $43,200 to $95,600 during this 22 year period. Using the point estimate from column (2), this implies a reduction of the craftsman wage premium by 4.4 percentage points, or by 2 percentage points when scaled to one decade. When regressing wages in the same sample on country-occupation xed eects, country-period xed eects and a linear trend (as in Table   2 when replacing the decade dummies with a linear trend), the point estimate implies an average decrease by 3.6 percentage points per decade. 45 When doing the corresponding calculations for relative craftsman employment, the capital intensity-changes suggest a reduction in relative craftsman employment by about 4.1 percentage points per decade, as compared to a trend decline of 7.8 percentage points.
Hence, the back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that capital deepening in manufacturing can account for more than half of the observed reductions of both relative craftsman wages and employment. In summary, the pervasive decline in the demand for manufacturing craftsmen has been accompanied by pervasive capital deepeningand panel regressions suggest that both trends have been related, consistent with the framework in Section 4.1. 44 Also for the full sample of estimated manufacturing capital intensities, Appendix Table A.4 shows signicant increases in all income and region groups (with the exception of Latin America, where point estimates are insignicant). 45 The precise calculations go as follows: The average increase in the log capital stock per worker between the rst and the last year in the sample is 0.685. Since (exp(-0.067*0.685)-1)*100=4.5 percentage points, and both years are on average 22 years apart, this corresponds to a (10/22)*4.4=2.0 percentage point decline in the craftsman wage premium when scaled to a 10 year-period. In the same sample, the point estimate of the`craftsman x trend'-term from a regression of log wages in this sample on country-occupation and country-period xed eects is -0.037 (not shown), and (exp(-0.037)-1)*100=3.6 percentage points. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
Specications in the rst three columns include only other manufacuring production occupations next to craftsmen, whereas specications in columns (4)- (6) compare manufacturing craftsman to white collar occupations.`Total' denotes the capital stock per worker in the total economy, taken from the Penn World Table. `Manuf.' stands for the capital stock per worker in aggregate manufacturing, estimated from the INDSTAT2 database as described in Appendix B.3.`By ind.' stands for industry-level capital stock estimates, seperately by 2-digit ISIC manufacturing industry. Bottom panel: specications in the rst two columns include the stacked employment shares of two groups of production occupations from each survey,`craftsmen' and`other production workers'. In columns (4) and (5) 
Deskilling of Craftsmen-or Upskilling of other Production Workers?
From the perspective of manufacturing production workers, the model from Section 4.1 oers a silver lining:
while automation reduces the demand for craftsmen, it increases the marginal productivity of other production tasks, creating the scope for higher wages in other production occupations. Also Autor (2015) highlights that while workplace automation has always made some tasks carried out by human labor obsolete, it has tended to increase the value of the remaining tasks which could not be automated. In addition, increasing automation may have created new and more skill-intensive tasks for other production workers, allowing them to acquire marketable skills comparable to those that craftsmen possessed traditionally.
While Braverman (1974) agreed that automation increased the demand for highly skilled production tasks, he believed that these tasks would be performed by white collar workers. By contrast, he did not believe in a compensating increase in the value of the remaining tasks carried out by production workers:`The mass of workers gain nothing from the fact that the decline in their command over the labor process is more than compensated for by the increasing command on the part of managers and engineers. On the contrary, not only does their skill fall in an absolute sense (in that they lose craft and traditional abilities without gaining new abilities adequate to compensate), but it falls even more in a relative sense' (pp. 294-295) .
The question is hence whether the decline in the relative wage of manufacturing craftsmen reects rst and foremost a decline in the value of craftsman skills (as Braverman forcefully argued), or at least in part increasing wages for other production workers (which may arise either from complementarity to the increasingly abundant capital, or from newly acquired skills). Since OWW includes wages for occupations outside of manufacturing, it allows me to answer this question by comparing wage trends of manufacturing craftsmen and other production workers relative to occupations from industries other than manufacturing in the same country-years, thereby controlling for general wage growth trends aecting all occupations symmetrically.
The rst two columns of Table 5 make this comparison for manufacturing craftsmen: the specications correspond to those from Table 2 (and hence include country-occupation and country-year xed eects), with the dierence that the reference group are wages from all non-manufacturing occupations in column
(1), and from all non-manufacturing occupations excluding white collar occupations in column (2). The case for excluding white collar occupations is that since they tend to be considerably more skilled than manufacturing craftsmen (cf. the wage premia in Figure 1 and Table 1 ), they may be less informative as a reference group than`production' occupations from other industries that require similar formal qualications as manufacturing production workers. 46 However, columns (1) and (2) show that the wages of manufacturing craftsmen decreased considerably regardless of whether one includes white collar occupations in the reference group, by 7.9-10.9 log points when comparing the 1950s to the 2000s.
By contrast, columns (3) and (4) show that the increase of other production wages up to the 1980s becomes insignicant once excluding white collar occupations from the reference group. 47 Appendix Table   A .3 presents the corresponding specications when including the occupations available since 1983: in this extended sample, craftsman wages declined signicantly since the 1980s, whereas wages in other production occupations did not increaseregardless of whether one includes white collar occupations in the reference group. Hence, wage trends robustly point to a decline in the wages of manufacturing craftsmen relative to the overall wage level, but not to an increases in the wages of other production workers.
To approach the same question from a dierent perspective, Table 6 compares the evolution of educational attainments of manufacturing craftsmen and other production workers to those among all wage employed (regardless of occupation or industry). All samples hence include three observations per survey, and specications include country xed eects to ensure that identication comes from within country-variation, as well as xed eects for each population group to control for dierences in the average educational attainment.
The rst row shows that unsurprisingly, educational attainments increased strongly over time among all wage-employed: most strongly for the share with at least completed secondary education (plus 9.1 percentage points per decade), followed by the share with completed primary education (plus 7.7 percentage points) and the share with completed tertiary education (plus 4.4 percentage points). 48 The second and third row present the point estimates of interaction terms with a`craftsman' and`other production worker' dummy. The rst column shows that for primary schooling, there are no signicant dierences, suggesting that attainments of manufacturing craftsmen and other production workers increased at roughly the same pace as for employees overall. By contrast, the share of both groups of workers with tertiary education in the third column increased signicantly more slowly than for the wage employed overall, reecting the fact that both are production occupations that do not usually require tertiary education.
Interestingly, column (2) shows that the share of manufacturing craftsmen with completed secondary education increased signicantly more slowly than among all wage employed, whereas the corresponding share of other manufacturing production workers did not increase more rapidly.
This corroborates the view that relative to the overall labor market, the primary eect of automation on production workers in manufacturing has been to reduce the value of handicrafts skills, as opposed to increasing the value of other skills that they possessed or acquired. This account is consistent with both the argument made by Braverman (1974) , and with the recent US evidence of deskilling among non-college workers by Autor (2019). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
taking a value of one for manufacturing craftsman occupations in columns (1)- (2), and for other manufacturing production occupations in columns (3)-(4). Column (1) compares wages in manufacturing craftsman occupations to all other occupations in OWW, except for other manufacturing production occupations. Column (2) excludes white collar occupations. Column (3) compares wages in other manufacturing production occupations to all other occupations in OWW, except for manufacturing craftsman occupations, and column (4) again excludes white collar occupations. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01. Each survey enters the sample with three observations: the reference category is the share with at least the respective educational attainment level among all wage-employed. In addition, the sample includes the corresponding shares for manufacturing craftsman and other production workers. For the`tertiary education' variable, I2D2 surveys include those who started their tertiary education, whereas IPUMS surveys include only those who also completed it.
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Concluding Remarks
It is widely accepted that today's labor markets are more skill-intensive than in the past, and that increasing human capital investments are necessary to seize the opportunities oered by the new technologies. The ndings of this paper highlight that while increasing human capital investments may be necessary, they do not guarantee success on the labor market: in spite of the substantial skills that they had acquired, manufacturing craftsmen have experienced pervasive declines in relative wages and employment opportunities since the 1950s, following the adoption of more capital-intensive production methods. At the same time, I
do not nd evidence of other manufacturing production workers acquiring marketable skills comparable to those that craftsmen traditionally possessed.
Declines in the demand for manufacturing craftsmen have been strongest in developing countries, where the scope for the adoption of capital-intensive production technologies was greatest in the beginning of my sample period. This is consistent with the model of manufacturing labor demand by Goldin and Katz (1998) , in which the automation of handicraft-intensive production tasks is deskilling. It is also consistent with the historical account of technology adoption by Comin and Hobijn (2010) , which points to substantial technology adoption lag lengths across countries, and with studies showing that imported`vintage capital'
plays an important role in developing countries. 49 However, the demand for manufacturing craftsmen continued to decline also in high income countries, suggesting that the experience of a declining market value of acquired craftsman skills has been shared by manufacturing production workers around the world. Deskilling of manufacturing production work can hence be considered as a an additional contributor to the wide-spread perception that`good' blue collar jobsthose in which even workers with little formal education can acquire valuable, marketable skillshave been lost in recent decades, which is corroborated by the nding of Autor (2019) that non-college workers in the US nowadays perform substantially less skilled work than they did in the past. This mechanism is distinct from the displacement of production workers by local trade shocks studied by , which has been linked to political polarization and social problems in the aected US communities (Autor et al., 2016 (Autor et al., , 2018 .
Moreover, recent case studies from China suggest that deskilling is likely to remain a possible outcome of workplace automation also in the future: Huang and Sharif (2017; document how the adoption of advanced production technology, supported by the Chinese government in an eort to move up in manufacturing value chains, has aected labor demand in ve manufacturing industries, and nd that the primary eect has been deskilling in two of them. 50 They also argue that the new technologies have reduced the bargaining power of experienced production workers in these industries by allowing factory managers to rely on younger and cheaper workers. 51 While recent studies nd little evidence of an economy-wide polarization of labor markets in developing countries (Maloney and Molina, 2016; Das and Hilgenstock, 2018) , my results suggest that within manufac-49 See Navaretti et al. (2000) and Raveh and Reshef (2016) for studies on the role of vintage capital in developing countries. Moreover, Verhoogen (2008) presents the case study of a German`Volkswagen' production line from the 1950s being used in Mexico to produce original`Beetle' cars for the domestic market up until 2003. 50 For instance, they report reduced training times for production workers in the`bicycle and motorcycle helmet' industry, following the adoption of industrial robots:`In our visit to Factory H, the manager explained to us that previously it took six months to train a novice operator to become procient in cutting venting holes in a bicycle helmet. Now, the same worker who is assigned to operate the robotic arm can nish the tasks very eectively in only three days' (Huang and Sharif 2017, p. 67) .
51 They give the example of an unsuccessful strike of experienced production workers in one of the factories in their study, specialized in manufacturing doors:`The veteran workers suddenly realized that they were no longer the backbone of the factory and their skills no longer automatically granted them workplace bargaining power. In their 40s, most feared that they would have great diculty nding other jobs if they were red, and quickly returned to their positions. Each striking worker was ned 100 yuan as punishment.' (Huang and Sharif 2017, p. 70). turing, the polarization of labor demand has been a global phenonemon which has started already before the advent of ICT. Braverman (1974) points to two possible consequenses: a reduction in the bargaining power of production workers since shorter training periods make them more easily replaceable (as is also highlighted in one of the Chinese case studies), and an increase in the`knowledge distance' between production and white collar workers, which makes transitions of production workers to management positions less likely. 52 Moreover, it is insightful to interpret the ndings of this paper through the lens of the task-model presented in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) : in their framework, automation may or may not increase total labor demand (depending on whether the demand for non-automatable tasks increases suciently to compensate for the displacement of labor from tasks henceforth performed by capital), and always decreases the labor share in value added. 53 This raises the question whether the displacement of production workers from production tasks documented in this paper has contributed to the global decline of the labor share since the early 1980s shown by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) . 54 Also for developing countries in recent decades, the evidence points to an accelerating pace of technology adoption (cf. World Bank (2008) and the ndings of this paper) accompanied by a strong reduction of labor shares, and Bessen (2015) argues that historically, technological changes which reduced the returns to experience had a tendency to also reduce labor shares for extended periods. 55 Finally, it is interesting to compare the recent experience of developing countries with automation to the US experience between the 1950s and 1970s: in the US, labor market prospects remained favorable during this period in spite of rapid automation, as rising incomes increased labor demand across a broad range of non-tradable sectors (Autor, 2015) . Also Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) suggest that the net impact of automation on labor demand depends on the broader labor market context, and that it is particularly prone to reducing labor demand when wages are low and labor is abundant. 56 From that perspective, labor markets in developing countries may be most strongly aected by further automation, and the future eect of automation on total labor demand in developed and developing countries alike will depend on how widely the associated productivity gains are shared.
Moreover, the accelerating pace of changes in labor markets around the world in recent years suggests that the phenomenon of specic human capital investments losing their market value is increasingly relevant also beyond manufacturing. The ndings of this paper do not imply that workers should abstain from making specic human capital investments. Rather, they highlight that in a technologically dynamic environment, 52 Braverman described the widening of the`knowledge gap' between production and white collar occupations as follows:`The more science is incorporated into the labor process, the less the worker understands of the process; the more sophisticated an intellectual product the machine becomes, the less control and comprehension of the machine the worker has. In other words, the more the worker needs to know in order to remain a human being at work, the less does he or she know ' (p. 295) . 53 A countervailing force is the introduction of new tasks in which labor has a comparative advantage, which increases the labor share.
54 Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) nd that manufacturing exhibited the third strongest decrease of ten industries since 1975 (cf. their Figure V) . For US manufacturing, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) argue that what distinguishes the period after 1987 from the previous four decades (during which the labor share remained roughly constant) is a slower pace at which new tasks have been created to compensate for the displacement of labor from automated tasks (cf. their Figures 3 and 5) . 55 For instance, a regression of the labor shares from the Penn World Table between 1980-2014 on country xed eects and a linear trend yields a signicant decline of 1.13 percentage points by decade in high income countries. For developing countries, the corresponding point estimate is 65 percent larger (-1.86) , and the dierence is only marginally insignicant when clustering standard errors at the country level (pval=0.147). Bessen (2015) gives two examples of falling labor shares in times of disruptive technological change: the stagnation of manufacturing wages during the introduction of steam power in the early period of the British Industrial Revolution, and falling average real wages in US manufacturing between 1899-1919 during the electrication of manufacturing plants. 56 This is because the productivity eect of automation is proportional to the cost-savings due to automation:`because the productivity gains of automation depend on the wage, the net impact of automation on labor demand will depend on the broader labor market context. When wages are high and labor is scarce, automation will generate a strong productivity eect and will tend to raise labor demand. When wages are low and labor is abundant, automation will bring modest productivity benets and could end up reducing labor demand ' (p. 11). such investments are inherently risky. Social safety nets and subsidized (re-)training programs then have insurance features, and may be necessary to incentivize workers to invest suciently in their human capital. Table 9 .0. To allow for exible relationships between occupational employment shares and ln GDP per capita, the best-tting third order polynomials of ln GDP per capita are selected using Stata's`fp' command (with default settings). For other production workers in column (1) and craftsmen in column (2), this polynomial consists of the terms x 3 , x 3 * ln(x), andx 3 * ln(x) 2 (denoting ln GDP per capita as`x' for simplicity). For white collar workers in column (3), the terms are x −2 ,x 3 and x 3 * ln(x). Due to collinearity, the polynomial terms are not individually signicant. However, the p-values of the F-tests for joint signicance in the third row of the bottom panel of the Table show that they are jointly signicant. The`mean dependent variables' do not exactly add up to 100, as the total include some manufacturing employees in major group 5 (`service and sales workers' ) and 6 (`skilled agricultural, forestry and shery workers' ). However, these major groups tend to play a negligible role in manufacturing employment. The routine task intensity (RTI) scores are calculated as in , based on the translation of task scores from the 1977 US`Dictionary of Occupational Titles' into sub-major groups of ISCO-88 by Goos et al. (2014) . It is normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one across these sub-major groups. The gure shows occupation group averages constructed from 11 sub-major groups that are relevant to manufacturing, as indicated by representation among the manufacturing occupations in OWW. This excludes major groups 5 (`Service and sales workers') and 6 (`Skilled agricultural, forestry and shery workers'), as well as some sub-major groups that do not play a role in manufacturing (for instance, sub-major group 23:`Teaching Professionals').
The RTI scores are calculated from the individual task scores shown in Figure A .5 as follows, following Autor et al. (2003) : rst, they are combined to produce three task aggregates: the Manual task measure corresponds to the DOT variable measuring an occupation's demand for eye-hand-foot coordination; the Routine task measure is a simple average of two DOT variables, set limits, tolerances and standards measuring an occupation's demand for routine cognitive tasks, and nger dexterity, measuring an occupation's use of routine motor tasks; and the Abstract task measure is the average of two DOT variables: direction control and planning, measuring managerial and interactive tasks, and GED Math, measuring mathematical and formal reasoning requirements. Second, the RTI index is constructed from these aggregates as the dierence between the log of Routine task score and the sum of the log of Abstract and the log of Manual tasks scores. description. I make use of a translation of these US scores into sub-major groups of ISCO-88 by Goos et al. (2014) .
The gure shows occupation group averages constructed from 11 sub-major groups that are relevant to manufacturing, as indicated by representation among the manufacturing occupations in the extended`Occupational Wages Around the World' database (and hence, in the ILO`October Inquiry', which it is based on-see for a description). This excludes major groups 5 (`Service and sales workers') and 6 (`Skilled agricultural, forestry and shery workers'), as well as some sub-major groups that appear not relevant for manufacturing (for instance, sub-major group 23:`Teaching Professionals'). The surveys from 133 countries for which the sample includes surveys from at least two years enter in the regressions with country xed eects.
B.3 Capital data
INDSTAT2 is a database maintained by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2018) which contains data on employment and gross xed capital formation in current US dollar for total manufacturing and by 2-digit manufacturing industry, mostly derived from industrial surveys. It is the largest database of its kind. Often, countries made reports jointly for several industries for at least some yearsfor instance, jointly for industries 18 (`manufacturing of wearing apparel and fur' ) and 19 (`Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear' ). In such instances, I aggregate all reports to the level of combined industries. To ensure consistency of the time series, I exclude observations from years for which only reports for a subset of the industries are available.
To prepare the investment data for the capital stock estimation, I deate the investment data to 2011 international prices, using the price level of capital formation from the Penn World Table 9 .0, and ll any gaps in the investment series by means of log-linear interpolations. Next, I use the`perpetual inventory method' to estimate capital stocks: as is commonly done in the literature, I estimate the initial capital stock as K 0 = I0 g+δ , with I 0 being the initial investment, g being the growth rate of investment, and δ being the depreciation rate. I calculate I 0 as the average of the investments in the rst three years to reduce the impact of measurement error, and follow Caselli (2005) in calculating g as the geometric average of growth rates in the (up to) rst 20 years and in assuming a depreciation rate of 6 percent. Then, the capital stock in period t can be estimated as K t = (1 − δ) * K t−t + I t , and the corresponding capital intensity results from dividing the estimated capital stock by the number of employees. The nal resulting data set contains estimated capital intensities from 125 countries between the 1963 and 2014.
I have veried that both the nding of a pervasive increase in manufacturing capital intensities since the 1960s, and its negative association with relative craftsman wages and employment, are robust to making a number of alternative assumptions: rst, it is robust to being more conservative in the interpolations of missing investment data by only interpolating gaps of up to 5 consecutive observations (and by keeping the longest spell for each investment series where this results in gaps). Second, it is robust to using the US investment price deator from PWT for all countries (similar to Rodrik (2013) , who justies the use of a common deator for manufacturing value added with the tradability of manufacturing goods. This argument C Description of ISCO ma jor groups 1. Legislators, senior ocials and managers: This major group includes occupations whose main tasks consist of determining and formulating government policies, as well as laws and public regulations, overseeing their implementation, representing governments and acting on their behalf, or planning, directing and coordinating the policies and activities of enterprises and organisations, or departments. Reference to skill level has not been made in dening the scope of this major group, which has been divided into three sub-major groups, eight minor groups and 33 unit groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent areas of authority and dierent types of enterprises and organisations.
2. Professionals: This major group includes occupations whose main tasks require a high level of professional knowledge and experience in the elds of physical and life sciences, or social sciences and humanities. The main tasks consist of increasing the existing stock of knowledge, applying scientic and artistic concepts and theories to the solution of problems, and teaching about the foregoing in a systematic manner. Most occupations in this major group require skills at the fourth ISCO skill level. This major group has been divided into four sub-major groups, 18 minor groups and 55 unit groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent elds of knowledge and specialisation.
3. Technicians and associate professionals: This major group includes occupations whose main tasks require technical knowledge and experience in one or more elds of physical and life sciences, or social sciences and humanities. The main tasks consist of carrying out technical work connected with the application of concepts and operational methods in the above-mentioned elds, and in teaching at certain educational levels. Most occupations in this major group require skills at the third ISCO skill level. This major group has been divided into four sub-major groups, 21 minor groups and 73 unit groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent elds of knowledge and specialisation. 4. Clerks: This major group includes occupations whose main tasks require the knowledge and experience necessary to organise, store, compute and retrieve information. The main tasks consist of performing secretarial duties, operating word processors and other oce machines, recording and computing numerical data, and performing a number of customer-oriented clerical duties, mostly in connection with mail services, money-handling operations and appointments. Most occupations in this major group require skills at the second ISCO skill level. This major group has been divided into two sub-major groups, seven minor groups and 23 unit groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent areas of specialisation.
5. Service workers and shop and market sales workers: (omitted) 6. Skilled agricultural and shery workers: (omitted) 7. Craft and related trades workers: This major group includes occupations whose tasks require the knowledge and experience of skilled trades or handicrafts which, among other things, involves an understanding of materials and tools to be used, as well as of all stages of the production process, including the characteristics and the intended use of the nal product. The main tasks consist of extracting raw materials, constructing buildings and other structures and making various products as well as handicraft goods. Most occupations in this major group require skills at the second ISCO skill level. This major group has been divided into four sub-major groups, 16 minor groups and 70 unit groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent areas of specialisation.
8. Plant and machine operators and assemblers: This major group includes occupations whose main tasks require the knowledge and experience necessary to operate and monitor large scale, and often highly automated, industrial machinery and equipment. The main tasks consist of operating and monitoring mining, processing and production machinery and equipment, as well as driving vehicles and driving and operating mobile plant, or assembling products from component parts. Most occupations in this major group require skills at the second ISCO skill level. This major group has been divided into three sub-major groups, 20 minor groups and 70 unit groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent areas of specialisation.
9. Elementary occupations: This major group covers occupations which require the knowledge and experience necessary to perform mostly simple and routine tasks, involving the use of hand-held tools and in some cases considerable physical eort, and, with few exceptions, only limited personal initiative or judgement. The main tasks consist of selling goods in streets, doorkeeping and property watching, as well as cleaning, washing, pressing, and working as labourers in the elds of mining, agriculture and shing, construction and manufacturing. Most occupations in this major group require skills at the rst ISCO skill level. This major group has been divided into three sub-major groups, ten minor groups and 25 unit groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent areas of work.
Source: ILO
